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ABSTRACT 
 
Audited financial statements are the basis for the communication of essential financial 
information.  Accordingly, the reliability of the financial statements is of extreme importance to all 
parties involved in the process.  This paper identifies the three primary parties as the 
organization, the auditor, and the user and recommends the user play an increased role in this 
process.  The user should be allowed to analyze the quality of the auditor and audit process based 
upon five critical factors that should be required to be disclosed by the auditor.  This paper 
discusses the five factors and how each one could benefit the user’s analysis of audit quality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
udited financial statements are the foundation for the communication of financial information.  In 
this information cycle, there are three major parties: the organization, auditor, and user.  All three 
have a vested interest in the reliability of the information and are faced with the risk that 
unintentional or intentional errors may be present.  Users of financial statements need the information to make 
economic decisions.  The organization may need to attract new or additional investments and maintain, or increase 
its stock value.  Lastly, the auditor needs to be free of the potential pressures and consequences of being associated 
with misleading financial statements. Therefore, all three parties have a vested interest in assuring the reliability of 
the financial statements. 
 
In the past, the primary responsibility has been placed on the organization and auditor to assure the 
reliability of the financial information.  The user should be allowed to play an integral part in the process by being 
given the opportunity to independently evaluate the quality of the audit process and the information presented.  The 
reliability of financial information should be a function of the three parties as presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Financial Statement Reliability – Principal Parties 
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User Information Risk 
 
The professionalism of the auditor and the quality of the audit process is an essential element affecting the 
reliability of financial statements.  Accordingly, information about the auditor and the audit process is critical and 
should be available to help reduce the risk that the auditor either intentionally or unintentionally contributed to 
reducing the reliability of the financial statements.  This risk has been identified as User’s Information Risk (UIR).   
To reduce this risk, American users already demand that financial statements be prepared in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. Furthermore, the audit should be conducted under the appropriate auditing 
standards so that users can have more confidence in the audit process.  
 
Users have frequently requested supplemental information from organizations that is not required to be 
disclosed under generally accepted accounting principles. In many cases, users require the organization to provide 
the additional information as an addendum to financial statements. The federal government requires additional 
information about major grants and compliance with them. Regulatory agencies frequently require statistical data or 
schedules that provide more detail than are contained in general purpose financial statements. In other cases, users 
reduce their UIR by obtaining even greater financial data in the form of a separate document. The rule of thumb 
seems to be that users can reduce their UIR by obtaining more detailed information about the organization’s 
finances. 
 
Thus, the accounting profession has taken steps to incorporate more detailed information about the 
organization in the financial statements and related disclosures. However, one area of information that is still lacking 
is more information about the auditor. Even with adequate financial information about an organization, a neglectful 
auditor can taint the information to the user’s detriment. The financial statements do not tell if the auditor has 
obtained a clean opinion under peer review standards, has adequate training in applicable areas, or even carries 
professional liability insurance coverage. Without reviewing the audit workpapers, the user cannot determine the 
extent of audit procedures performed or whether the auditors used professional care in performing their duties. The 
user relies on the accounting profession to police its own auditors. 
 
Users want a high level of confidence in the professionals that conduct the audit. Auditors are required to 
use due professional care in conducting their work, and must maintain their technical proficiency in areas that are 
important to their clients. However, adequate consideration has not been given to the quality of the auditor when 
relying on financial statements. A lack of concern about the auditor can be harmful because a poor-quality auditor 
can readily produce a poor-quality audit. 
 
U.S. auditing standards have been strengthened in the area of independence and the use of a risk-based 
approach.  In addition, new peer review standards provide more “transparency” in the peer review reporting process 
so that the peer review report now refers to a letter of comments. These improvements are primarily the result of 
high-profile audit failures in recent years. Traditionally, the auditor has tried to control reliability issues by 
managing audit risk while the organization focuses on corporate governance and internal control issues.  The user 
should have the ability to participate in this process by having the opportunity to evaluate “User Information Risk” 
(UIR).  
 
The measurement of UIR is based on the evaluation of the five factors presented in the following model: 
 
UIR = f (TE, MAT, AT, APR, PLI,)  
 
where: 
 
TE= Auditor’s training and experience 
MAT= Dollar threshold of materiality 
AT= Auditor’s tenure on the engagement 
APR= Summary of auditor’s latest peer review 
PLI= Extent of professional liability insurance carried by auditor 
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1.   Auditor’s Training and Experience Disclosure 
 
To improve audit quality, the auditor should possess the technical expertise needed to conduct the audit in a 
professional manner. Under auditing standards generally accepted in the U.S., the first general standard pertains to 
auditor fitness. The standard states that “the audit is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate 
technical training and proficiency as an auditor (AICPA – AU Section 210.01).” This standard encompasses the 
assumption that the auditor must have the training, experience, and skill in those particular areas that pertain to the 
organization being audited.  
 
There is no fool-proof way for a user to be certain that an auditor has the technical proficiency needed to 
perform a quality audit. However, to communicate information about the auditor’s training and experience, auditing 
standards should require the auditor to attach his or her professional history as a supplement to the audit report. The 
attachment should inform the reader about the auditor’s professional experience as well as recent training that 
supports the qualifications of the auditor. In this way, the user can better understand the qualifications of the 
principal audit team. 
 
Attaching qualification information is already used by other professionals when submitting opinion-type 
documents. To provide assurance that the auditor is competent, information should be made available to the user to 
assess whether the auditor has obtained pertinent and applicable training. Some users have established minimum 
continuing education requirements that go beyond the requirements of generally accepted auditing standards. For 
example, practitioners performing audits under Government Auditing Standards must have at least 24 hours of 
governmental continuing education every two years. It seems plausible this trend would continue so that specific 
training is demanded of auditors.  
 
General Audit Procedures Training  
 
Auditor training can protect and benefit the auditor.  This training may alert the auditor to updates on audit 
techniques, industry trends, and common audit deficiencies. A wide disparity of auditor proficiency results when an 
important area such as training is left up to the judgment of the auditor. Another complication results from the CPE 
requirements that vary from state to state and nation to nation. Therefore, another benefit to attaching information 
about auditor training is that, over time, users would likely gravitate to a more standardized set of minimum CPE 
requirements. Users and related associations become the “consumer” demanding certain minimum auditor training 
standards. If there were a mechanism for users to ascertain the training and experience of the auditor, then users 
could feel more comfortable about the auditor’s abilities.  
 
2.  Materiality Disclosure 
 
A second factor of UIR pertains to the concept of materiality. Materiality is determined by the auditor and 
is used in both the planning and evaluation phases of the audit.   In developing materiality levels, the auditor should 
consider both quantitative and qualitative factors and take into consideration the views of multiple users.   
 
An inherent risk in the determination of materiality arises because there could be a great deal of variation of 
what constitutes materiality. It is a known fact that materiality may vary from audit firm to audit firm, client to client 
and from user to user.  Items of financial interest might not be disclosed if the auditor, in his or her judgment, 
determines the item is not material. However, that same information might be of substantial interest to the user even 
though the amount was not deemed material enough for disclosure by the auditor. Of course, another auditor might 
establish a lower threshold of materiality and disclose the item. Thus, users would have more confidence in the audit 
if they knew the materiality threshold. Disclosure of quantitative materiality information could help users to avoid 
this confusion.  
 
3.   Auditor Tenure Disclosure 
 
The effect of auditor tenure on audit quality has been a matter of debate for several years. A recent study 
concluded that fraudulent financial statement reporting was lower when the auditors had greater tenure (Carcello and 
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Nagy, 2004).  These findings mirror another study that measured the perception of quality on the part of users of 
financial statements as a function of auditor tenure (Ghosh and Moon, 2005). This research concluded that investors, 
independent rating agencies and analysts, had more confidence in financial statements where the auditors had a 
longer relationship with the client.   Therefore, disclosure of audit tenure could prove to be valuable in the 
evaluation of UIR. 
 
4.   Peer Review Disclosure 
 
The standards require auditors to undergo a quality/peer review to assess whether their quality control 
system can provide reasonable assurance that the firm will not conduct poor quality audits. Areas covered by peer 
review standards include: acceptance of clients, training, hiring, engagement procedures, and monitoring. The peer 
review movement has shown a degree of success over its history; however, there have been many criticisms of the 
process, especially in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley hearings. 
 
For example, firms that belong to the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) and perform audits under 
Government Auditing Standards must undergo a peer review every three years. However, what remains are firms 
that do not belong to the AICPA and also firms that perform audits in those states that do not require peer reviews of 
its members. If the firm belongs to the SEC practice section of the AICPA, the peer review opinion and letter of 
comments are available to the public. However, this is relatively small number of the total practicing firms. Since 
most firms do not belong to this special section of the AICPA, their peer review opinion and letter of comments are 
not available.  
 
Another problem rests in the peer review process itself, which many practitioners feel does not do an 
adequate job of weeding out poorly performing professionals. It was certainly distressing that the “Big 4” 
accounting firms received unmodified peer review opinions yet massive audit failures performed by these same 
firms have recently occurred. In the interest of communicating with the public, the report should contain a brief 
statement about the nature of peer reviews. Furthermore, the auditor should disclose whether the firm belongs to any 
special sections of the AICPA which would tell the reader that the audit firm is subject to additional requirements.  
 
5.  Professional Liability Insurance Disclosure 
 
Another area in which users can find comfort is whether the auditor carries professional liability insurance.  
The existence or nonexistence of sufficient insurance coverage may be important information about the auditor.  
First, firms with several claims tend to be purged from coverage or charged ever-higher premiums. A high claim 
history may be caused by performing audits in risky situations or by performing poor-quality audits. Second, 
insurance provides a means to recover losses that result from reliance on deficient audits. Therefore, it would be of 
benefit to users of financial statements if there was disclosure about the firm’s insurance coverage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Audited financial statements are the basis for the communication of essential financial information.  
Accordingly, the reliability of the financial statements is of extreme importance to all parties involved in the process.  
Up to now, the organization and auditor have been the primary parties entrusted with insuring reliability.  This paper 
recommends the user can, and should, play a prominent role in this process by being allowed to analyze the quality 
of the auditor and audit process.  In order for the user of financial statements to ascertain whether the audit was 
conducted with quality, five critical factors about the auditor and the audit process need to be disclosed. First, there 
should be disclosure of the auditor’s experience and/or training. Second, the auditor should disclose the dollar 
threshold for materiality so the user can determine the degree of precision of the audit. Third, the auditor should 
disclose the number of years on the audit engagement so the user can assess whether there has been sufficient 
tenure, auditor rotation, or possible opinion shopping.   Fourth, the auditor should disclose whether they obtained a 
peer review and the nature and results of that peer review. Finally, the audit should disclose the professional liability 
insurance coverage carried by the auditor. This potential process is designed to involve the user and give them the 
opportunity to share the responsibility for reducing the risk of using financial information.  These recommendations 
require sweeping changes to audit disclosures, not because there is more disclosure about the client, but because 
there are disclosures about the auditor. 
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